The Road to November Elections

By Susan Frisbie
WCCN Development & Marketing Director

Over the past year, Nicaragua has slowly been gaining media coverage in the U.S. The fact that Nicaragua, a country that most Americans have long forgotten, has appeared on the mainstream U.S. media radar can only indicate one thing— elections are approaching. This is not uncommon; after all, the same trend of media coverage can be seen all over Latin America especially when a leading candidate does not fit the Washington neoliberal mold. In Nicaragua, that candidate is Daniel Ortega. And inevitably where Ortega’s name appears in print, Hugo Chavez’s name follows, setting off red flags all over Washington.

Chavez’s support of Ortega and the Sandinista National Liberation Front (FSLN) has unnerved Washington and is contrasted by the Bush Administration’s backing of Liberal Constitutionalist Party (PLC) dissident Eduardo Montealegre of the Nicaraguan Liberal Alliance-Conservative Party (ALN-PC). However, according to Carlos Chamorro, the journalist son of former president Violeta Chamorro, “Venezuela has been much smarter in its policy than the United States… The Venezuelan ambassador keeps a very low profile… By contrast, the United States comes across as arrogant. Trivelli [U.S. Ambassador to Nicaragua] behaves like a political actor who opines every day on who should be president.”1

Ortega and Chavez have undergone immense criticism for brokering a deal with 53 FSLN mayors, which would offer Venezuelan oil on low-interest credit with generous repayment terms to Sandinista municipalities. So far, logistics and an uncooperative rightwing Bolaños government have impeded any shipments. However, many Nicaraguan farmers are receiving reduced price fertilizer also on offer from Venezuela. Ortega has claimed that the Venezuelan oil shipments would not only help solve the Nicaraguan energy crisis, but also free up much needed funding for social programs. Washington has dismissed Ortega’s claims as propaganda.

Countering Venezuela, Washington, through Ambassador Trivelli, has gone as far as offering to fund rightwing primaries to unite the right against Ortega. However, the PLC refused to participate. Trivelli has also been very vocal in what has been called “a volley of verbal grenades”2 from Washington aimed at Ortega. In perhaps one of Trivelli’s most memorable remarks, he called Ortega “a tiger who has not changed his stripes.” Stronger than Trivelli’s metaphorical quips are the implications made by threatening statements from “diplomatic” officials such as former Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs, Roger Noriega who said that under a Sandinista president, “Nicaragua would sink like a stone and reach the depths such as that of Cuba.”

However, what Noriega forgets is that despite adhering to neoliberal economic reforms over the last 16 years, the depth of Nicaragua’s poverty is far deeper than that of Cuba. With 80% of its population living on less than $2 a day, Nicaragua is the second poorest country in the Western Hemisphere after Haiti. Additionally, Nicaragua also holds the dubious distinction of having the lowest level of social spending in all of Latin America due to the harsh aid conditions of international institutions like the IMF and World Bank.

In many ways it is easy to step back in time to the eighties and reduce the election to simply a battle between Ortega’s “populism” and Washington’s neoliberal economics, but the reality is the political landscape in Nicaragua has evolved, for better or worse, quite a bit over the last 16 years. Unfortunately, Washington’s tactics have changed little.

Moreover, some media outlets have touted Ortega’s run as a “comeback”. However, Ortega’s so-called “comeback” has been painted in an all too simplistic palette of black and white. This is best illustrated by a fact anyone who follows Nicaraguan politics closely would know—Daniel Ortega has never left the Nicaraguan political playing field. In fact, Ortega wields more power in Nicaragua today than perhaps he did as president in the eighties. The FSLN occupies the majority of seats in the National Assembly, Supreme Court, and Supreme Electoral Council. Ortega has been able to maintain power despite losing the presidency in the 1990 elections due in part to failed U.S. policy that focused almost obsessively on discrediting him. Short-sighted U.S. foreign policy, or more importantly aid money that flowed from that policy, only augmented the power of the now disgraced former-president Arnoldo Alemán. Despite being convicted on embezzlement charges, Alemán still exerts a powerful hand in Nicaraguan politics because of the infamous “pact”. Established in 2000, the “pact” created what has been called a “two-headed” dictatorship under which rightwing Alemán and leftwing Ortega, who both maintain iron grips over their parties, institutionally consolidated power between the PLC and FSLN.

Easily lost in all of the meddling by outside actors and internal corruption are the issues that most affect Nicaraguans today— most notably the slagging economy, high unemployment and underemployment, and most recently rampant power outages. However, in the approaching elections the latter issues are often mixed with the former.

The Elections Take Shape

The closely contested November election is shaping up to be one of the most important in paving the direction and future of Nicaragua since 1990. The four-way race pits two rightwing candidates versus two leftwing candidates, which is a first in Nicaragua. But what perhaps makes this election the most unique are the “pact”/“anti-pact” divisions that exist on both sides.

In order to win the presidency in the first round, the winning candidate must secure at least 35 percent of the vote and defeat his closest opponent by at least five percentage points. As the polls now indicate, if elections were held today no candidate would be the outright winner thus forcing the first and second place candidates into an unprecedented run-off.

The most recent poll by Borges y Asociados places the FSLN’s Ortega in the lead with 31.5 percent
with Washington-favored Eduardo Montealegre (ALN-PC) in second with 29 percent. Trailing the leaders are the PLC’s José Rizo with 15.7 percent and Sandinista Renovation Movement (MRS) candidate Edmundo Jarquín with 15.2 percent. Jarquín took over the candidacy representing the MRS in early July following the sudden death of former Managua mayor Herty Lewites, who left the FSLN after being denied the opportunity to face Ortega in primary elections. Perhaps the most important polling percentage to look at is how Ortega and Montealegre would stack up against each other in case of a run-off. Of those surveyed 43.1 percent indicated they would vote for Montealegre and 32.6 percent Ortega. However, another poll by M&R Consultores, which factored into account that eight percent of those registered to vote would abstain indicated that Ortega was only one-tenth of one percent away from winning the needed 35 percent with Montealegre coming in a distant second at 27.2 percent followed by Jarquín at 21.6 and Rizo at 14.9. That said, the poll also indicated that in a run-off scenario Montealegre would easily defeat Ortega.

Putting the Candidates in Perspective

On the Right

Montealegre draws much of his support from pro-business elites who have grown tired of the strong ties the PLC maintains with corrupt Alemán as well as anti-pact centrists. However, as demonstrated by his amicable relationship with current president Enrique Bolaños and the favoritism placed on him by Washington, Montealegre’s platform indicates that despite being a more “democratic choice” as Ambassador Trivelli has called him, economically speaking, policy would change little. Furthermore, although Montealegre is opposed to the pact, he is closely linked in a banking scandal in which $500 million dollars in state bonds were issued to bail out outstanding debts of several private banks. Not only was Montealegre the Minister of Public Finance when the bonds were issued, but he was also a major shareholder in one of the banks.

The other rightwing candidate, Rizo, also shares U.S. economic interests, but is campaining on ‘social Liberalism’ bill. However, because the convicted-felon Alemán still drives the PLC machine, Rizo, though not implicated in any corruption himself, has fallen out of favor with Washington. Rizo’s PLC has been unwilling to budge in its devotion to Alemán despite Washington’s efforts to unify the right. Some believe that as the elections draw even closer, the PLC may throw its support behind Montealegre if Ortega’s poll numbers rise. That said, should this scenario come to pass, it seems unlikely that the PLC would abandon Alemán.

The Ties that Bind

The “pact” has bound the PLC and the FSLN since 2000. As stated in July’s issue of the University of Central America’s Envío, the PLC and the FSLN are “rivals on stage and allies behind the curtain.”3 This staged rivalry is continuing into the election as both parties are claiming to wish to undo the pact they created, without taking credit for its implementation. The anti-pact strategy the PLC and the FSLN are taking is undoubtedly a direct response to Montealegre and the Jarquín’s ability to garner support due to their anti-pact stances.

The neoliberal option that both Montealegre and Rizo offer would better serve Washington’s interest. However, despite the fact that both the FSLN and the MRS are campaigning on an alternative economic platform, it is clear whom Washington would prefer of the two. On a recent visit to Nicaragua, U.S. Assistant Secretary of State for Western Hemisphere Affairs Thomas Shannon visited with both Montealegre and then MRS candidate Herty Lewites, who only days later died suddenly of a heart attack. Shannon described both men as “the future of this county,” while snubbing Ortega and Rizo.

On the Left

Ortega has continually expressed that his Marxist days are long behind him and what he seeks now are “free but just markets”. Perhaps the Bush Administration disdains Ortega not so much for his economic stance, but for what his presence in these elections signifies to Washington - failed foreign policy. Ortega, despite leading in the polls, remains unpopular mostly due to his involvement in creating the “pact” and the dictator-like grip he maintains over the FSLN. In a 2005 M&R Consultores poll, 89 percent of Nicaraguans responded that they thought Ortega should step down as FSLN leader. However, Ortega has tried to clean up his image by touting a “reconciliation” ticket. His vice-presidential candidate Jaime Morales Carazo is a former banker, PLC insider, and political leader of the U.S.-backed Contras—not exactly the candidate you would expect to find sharing a ticket with Ortega. Making the partnership even stranger is the fact that Ortega and his family currently live in a house, or rather compound, which had belonged to Morales. The home was confiscated by the Sandinistas after the revolution, due to Morales’ ties to Somoza. Adding to speculation as to the genuine nature of the left-right Sandinista ticket is the fact that Morales is said to have been a leading orchestrator of the “pact” for the PLC’s Alemán. Many remain skeptical claiming the “duo are opportunists whose pairing illustrates the eroding ideologies in a nation that was paralyzed last year after a pact between once-warring parties.”4

When MRS candidate Herty Lewites died in early July, there was endless speculation as to what would happen to his legions of supporters who longed for a renewed Sandinismo, one free of the corruption that has plagued Ortega and the FSLN. So far the numbers indicate that they have held firm in their support of Lewites’ ideals. Lewites’ anti-pact status and commitment to pursuing a more socially just economic policy made him a favorite amongst voters who sought democratic and economic change, where with other candidates it often appeared voters would have to sacrifice one for the other. Stepping into Lewites’ shoes is no easy feat especially if you are Edmundo Jarquín who has spent most of the last 15 years out of the country working for various international finance agencies including the Inter-American Development Bank (IDB). Jarquín, the son-in-law of former president Violeta Chamorro, has had little time to make political enemies but also finds himself a virtual unknown in Nicaraguan politics, lacking the political machinery and funding that is driving the other candidates campaigns. It is perhaps because of this lack of name recognition that the MRS chose Carlos Mejía Godoy as Jarquín’s vice-presidential candidate. Mejía Godoy, who may be best known for authoring many revolutionary hymns as well as the FSLN anthem, is one of the most recognizable figures in Nicaragua. Adding Mejía Godoy to the ticket perhaps has assured voters that despite Jarquín’s history working with agencies like the IDB, which have netted low development returns, the MRS stands behind its slogan, “No more of the same.”

The Road Ahead

On August 19, the candidates officially kicked-off their campaigns laying out their proposals for Nicaragua’s future. The Nicaraguan electorate is faced with making a profound decision. Voters must not only navigate through the sea of promises they have heard for so many years, but also threats from the North counterbalanced by offers of assistance from the South. Despite being offered a changed cast of candidates, voters are faced with “more of the same” from those outside actors who would like to direct the elections. However, in the end, the Nicaraguan voters will hold the final casting call results.

1 Aizenman, N.C. (2006) “Sandinista Aims for Comeback in Nicaragua,” The Washington Post, 23 July 2006.
2 Otis, John (2006) “U.S. Playing Favorites in Nicaragua,” Houston Chronicle, 20 August 2006.
3 Envío (2006) “Herty Lewites Now a ‘Spiritual Candidate,’” July 2006.
4 Robles, Frances (2006) “Ortega Chooses Former Enemy as Running Mate,” Miami Herald, 28 June 2006.